Different monetary aggregates covary very differently with short term nominal interest rates. Broad monetary aggregates like M1 and the monetary base covary positively with current and future values of short term interest rates. In contrast, the nonborrowed reserves of banks covary negatively with current and future interest rates. Observations like this 'sign switch' lie at the core of recent debates about the effects of monetary policy actions on short term interest rates. This paper develops a general equilibrium monetary business cycle model which is consistent with these facts. Our basic explanation of the 'sign switch' is that movements in nonborrowed reserves are dominated by exogenous shocks to monetary policy, while movements in the base and M1 are dominated by endogenous responses to non-policy shocks.
Introduction
Different monetary aggregates covary very differently with short term nominal interest rates.
Broad monetary aggregates like MI and the monetary base covary positively with current and future values of short term interest rates. In contrast, the nonborrowed reserves of banks covary negatively with current and future interest rates. Observations like this 'sign switch' lie at the core of recent debates about the effects of monetary policy actions on short term interest rates.' This paper develops a general equilibrium monetary business cycle model which is consistent with these facts. Our basic explanation of the 'sign switch' is that movements in nonborrowed reserves are dominated by exogenous shocks to monetary policy, while movements in the base and MI are dominated by endogenous responses to non-policy shocks.
To make this argument we require a model with the following features. First, it must allow for several types of shocks. This is a necessary condition for addressing the sign switch observations. Here, we take the simplest possible approach, by allowing for two shocks: exogenous shocks to the growth rate of the monetary base and exogenous shocks to technology. Second, the model must have elements which have the effect of endogenizing the broad monetary aggregates. In our setup, the most important element is a banking sector which produces loans and demand deposits. These respond positively to favorable technology shocks. Since these shocks also have the effect of raising equilibrium interest rates, the model can account for the observed positive correlation between Ml and interest rates. Third, to account for the positive relation between the monetary base and interest rates we take a particular stand on Federal reserve monetary policy. We assume that innovations to the growth rate of the monetary base are composed of two components, each of which is set by the monetary authority. (The composition of the base, between bank reserves and currency, l Authors like Eichenbaum (1992,1995) , Eichenbaum (1991) and Strongin (1995) who have emphasized the behavior of nonborrowed reserves, claim to have found strong evidence of important liquidity effects, i.e., that one-time, positive policy shocks to the monetary base drive nominal interest rates down. Authors like Barro (1981) , King (1991) , Mishkin (1981) and Gordon and Leeper (1993) who have emphasized the behavior of monetary aggregates like the base and MI claim that the evidence in favor of liquidity effects is weak or nonexistent.
is determined endogenously.) One component is purely exogenous, while the other reacts to contemporaneous innovations in technology. We identify the former with innovations to the nonborrowed component of the monetary base. We identify the latter, which is positively correlated with interest rates, with innovations in borrowed reserves. It is the reactive component of innovations to the monetary base that allows the model to account for the observed positive correlation between the base and the interest rate.2 Fourth, our model must incorporate elements which imply that nonborrowed reserves covary negatively with the interest rate. We accomplish this in part by including features in the model which ensure that exogenous policy shocks to the base generate important liquidity effects. The friction that accomplishes this in our model is the same as that underlying the limited participation assumption used in Lucas (1991) , Fuerst (1992) , Christiano (1991) and Eichenbaum (1992,1995) . This is the assumption that households do not adjust their currency holdings immediately in response to shocks in their environments.
The papers just cited embed the limited participation assumption in cash-in-advance environments. In our model, agents can use demand deposits and credit, in addition to cash, to make consumption purchases. We adapt the limited participation assumption to this richer environment. When we do this, we find that a positive policy shock to the base drives interest rates down in the model.
The limited participation assumption, together with our specification of monetary policy, guarantees that innovations to nonborrowed reserves coincide exactly with innovations to the exogenous component of monetary policy. Given our specification of policy, the only way this could fail to be true is if the limited participation assumption did not hold and currency holdings could contemporaneously respond to shocks. For example, a positive innovation to technology could in principle trigger a positive innovation in nonborrowed reserves if it generated a contemporaneous fall in currency holdings. Similarly, an exogenous $1 increase in the monetary base could generate less than a $1 increase in nonborrowed reserves if it 2Movements in the nonborrowed component of the monetary base (i.e., currency plus nonborrowed reserves) are implemented by the actions of the Federal Reserve Open Market committee. The movements in reserves are `nonborrowed' because they are effected by a swap of ownership over assets: reserves at the central bank in exchange for interest bearing assets, typically U.S. government debt. Movements in borrowed reserves occur with variations in the amount of loans made by at the Federal Reserve discount window. Our model of the actions of these two organs of the Fed abstracts from the details of how they implement policy, and simply assumes that they effect changes in reserves by 'helicopter drop'. triggered a contemporaneous rise in currency. But, the limited participation assumption rules out contemporaneous responses of currency to shocks.
Though innovations to nonborrowed reserves reflect only exogenous policy shocks to the base, nonborrowed reserves are nevertheless endogenous in our model because they respond to all shocks with a delay. Still, our assumptions are enough to guarantee that movements in nonborrowed reserves are quantitatively dominated by exogenous monetary policy shocks.
We presume that our basic results would also obtain if innovations to the nonborrowed component of the base contained a contemporaneous reactive component.
In sum, our model accounts for the positive comovements between the base, M1 and the interest rate as reflecting the importance of shocks to the demand for money (stemming, in our analysis, from technology shocks), the ability of the banking system to produce inside money, and the nature of monetary policy. It accounts for the negative comovements between nonborrowed reserves and the interest rate as reflecting the importance of liquidity effects in the monetary transmission mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize some key facts regarding the dynamic co-movements between different monetary aggregates, output and the federal funds rate. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 reports its quantitative properties. Finally, section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
Some Basic Facts
In this section we briefly summarize some basic facts about the dynamic comovements between the federal funds rate, real GNP and different monetary aggregates. These facts motivate the model of section 3 by documenting the sign switch' and lead -lag relationships between money and output discussed in the introduction.
We consider three monetary aggregates: non borrowed reserves, NBR (CITIBASE mnemonic FMRNBC), the base, MO (FMBASE), and M1 (FM1). In addition we use data on the federal funds rate, FF (FYFF) and real GDP, Y,(GDP). The (quarterly) time series on all these variables display pronounced trends over the sample period 1959:1 -1992:4. Consequently, some stationarity-inducing transformation of the data must be adopted. Here we work with the filter developed by Hodrick and Prescott (1980) . Specifically, all of the statistics discussed in this section pertain to variables which have been logged and processed via the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter. Consider first the results for nonborrowed reserves. Notice that there is a strong, statistically significant negative contemporaneous correlation (-.54) between FF, and NBRt.
Also note that FFt is negatively correlated with leads and lags of N BRt up to one year.3
The key thing to notice about the correlations involving MO and M1 is how different they are from those involving nonborrowed reserves. In particular, neither MO nor M1 displays a significant contemporaneous correlation with FF1 . Moreover both are positively correlated with future values of FF, but negatively correlated with lagged values of FF' . Interestingly, the only significant difference between the correlations involving MO and MI is that the latter are estimated much more precisely. In any event, it is clear that nonborrowed reserves 3 Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) document the robustness of these conclusions to different sample periods and different transformations of the data. covary quite differently with the federal funds rate than does M1. The term 'sign switch' is a short hand way of summarizing the main difference: nonborrowed reserves are negatively correlated with current and future values of the federal funds rate while the opposite is true for MO and Ml. Based on these correlations, it is perhaps not surprising that analysts working with MO and M1 conclude that innovations in these monetary aggregates lead to a rise in interest rates while analysts working with NBR conclude the opposite. known observation that interest rates tend to be at their highest level at the peak of the business cycle. So a high level of the time t interest rate is associated with lower future values of real output. This is reflected in the fact that F Ft displays a sharp negative correlation with current and future growth rates of output (e.g. p(F Ft , AYt) = -.33) and p(F Ft , .6.Yi+t) -.52). In conjunction with the recent VAR literature aimed at studying the dynamic effects of exogenous shocks to monetary policy, these findings provide strong motivation for developing monetary business cycle models. 4 To us it seems unlikely that business cycle models -real or 4See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1994) and the references therein. monetized -which do not take asset markets frictions seriously -will be able to convincingly account for the fact that high interest rates are a signal of lower future output.
We conclude this section by summarizing the key features of the data that we wish to account for. To summarize, there are three key facts that a reasonable monetary business cycle model ought to be consistent with. First, different monetary aggregates covary differently with interest rates and output. Simple monetized business cycle models which do not distinguish between different concepts of money cannot hope to account for these features of the data. Moreover, attempts to evaluate those models are inevitably forced to arbitrarily focus on one or another of the competing monetary aggregates. To us, this serves as strong motivation for developing models with multiple monetary aggregates.Second, high nominal interest rates forecast downturns in output. Third, broad monetary aggregates are positively correlated with output.
The Model
We consider a two sector economy that is populated by a large number of infinitely lived households. The first sector produces a good that can be consumed or invested as capital.
The second sector consists of banks who produce demand deposits for households and make loans for working capital and investment purchases. Households supply labor and capital to both sectors. In addition they purchase consumption goods using a stochastic 'shopping technology' that allows households to economize on shopping time by use of currency and demand deposits. Analogous to existing limited participation models, we assume that, each period, households allocate their nominal assets between currency and interest bearing deposits at banks. These deposits along with deposits arising from cash injections by the monetary authority constitute the reserves of the banking sector.
The Goods Producing Finn: Technology and Choice Problem
The technology for producing new goods is given by:
Here af is a positive scalar, 0 < a < 1 while kft , aft , and /ft denote time t units of capital, number of persons working, and the length of the workweek in the goods producing sector, respectively. The economy wide technology parameter zt evolves according to
where p > 0. The variable x it evolves according to x jt eff t _ 1 exp(cp). Here en is a mean zero, iid shock to the production technology which has standard deviation a-. Output of this sector can either be consumed or invested to augment the capital stock. respectively. Notice that firms equate the time marginal product of the different factors of production to their marginal costs, inclusive of financing costs for working capital loans.
Banking Finns: Technology and Choice Problem
The banking technology is used to produce demand deposits which are useful for making transactions. This technology is given by:
Here eti , is a positive scalar, 0 < a < 1 while kbt , nbt , and ibt denote time t units of capital, number of persons working and the length of the workweek in the banking sector, respectively.
The variable e t denotes the real value of time t excess reserves.
This formalization of the 'banking' technology is consistent with Lucas (1993) who assumes that real resources are required to run the banking sector. In actuality, it is costly for banks to manage their assets and their liabilities. As in Lucas (1993), we choose in this paper to concentrate on the costs of managing the bank's major liability: demand deposits.
Notice that we have included excess, rather than total reserves, as inputs to the production process for demand deposits. This is because, from the perspective of the banking system, required reserves play no role in protecting the system from unusually large withdrawals of currency. Below we discuss the role of reserve requirements in determining total, required and excess reserves.
The banks' assets consist of cash reserves and loans. Cash reserves flow to the bank from two sources. At the beginning of the period, households deposit At dollars in the bank. In addition, during the period, the monetary authority debits or credits households' checking accounts with X t dollars. Consequently, total time t cash reserves of the banking system equal At Xt . At the end of this section we discuss the law of motion for Xt.
Banks use cash reserves to make loans to finance working capital as well new investment purchases. Let St denote the bank's time t loans:
where Kt equals kit plus Ku. The total time t assets of the banking system are equal to its reserves plus outstanding loans: A t + Xt Se.
The mechanics of a bank loan work as follows. When a bank makes a loan, it sets up a checking account for the amount of the loan. So the time t liabilities of the banking system equal total demand deposits, Dt : the sum of the households' and firms' checking accounts
Since total liabilities equal total assets, we have that
The monetary authority imposes a reserve requirement that banks must hold at least a fraction r of their demand deposits in the form of currency. Consequently, nominal excess reserves, Et , are given by
Consider now the choice problem of the banking firm. The time t interest rate on a bank loan, which is repaid at the end of the period, is given by ra t . The interest rate which banks pay households on demand deposits, 11 , is determined at the beginning of the period prior to the realization of the time t shocks. Banks borrow and lend reserves in an inter bank spot market after the realization of the monetary policy shock. Let rat (wt ) denote the time t interest rate on inter bank loans in the spot market. Here w t denotes the time t state of the world.
To develop the relationship between Ea, and rat (wt ), we let qt (wt ) denote the beginning of time t forward price of a unit of reserves to be delivered at the end of time t, in state wt . We normalize these forward prices so that a" q t(wt) is equal to one. The interpretation is that a promise to purchase one unit of reserves at time t, state wt costs qt (wt ) units of reserves at the beginning of the period.
Profit maximization by banks implies that In what follows we suppress the explicit dependence of r at on wt . Below we discuss the determination of the forward prices.
Total interest payments on demand deposits valued at spot prices are rat (St + A t Xt).
Since operating costs are (1 + r ktPtKbt W t (lbt )( 1 + ryt)r ibt, the problem of the bank is to maximize time t profits
by choice of At , St, hi ) lbt, and nbt subject to (3.8), (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11). The first order conditions to this problem are given by
(3.17)
Here hkt , h it, and he, denote the time t marginal products of capital, persons, workweek and excess reserves in producing demand deposits.
To provide intuition for these first order conditions, use (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) to consolidate the constraints on the bank's problem as 
Abstracting from reserve requirements, if the bank has one more unit of capital it can increase total real loans by h kt (the marginal product of capital in loan production). But with reserve requirements, when a bank increases loans by $1, its required reserves rise by $r so that excess reserves falls by Sr. Because excess reserves are productive, other things equal, total loans must (because of the production technology) fall by Th e,. When capital is used to create a loan this effect must be taken into account, so that the net increase in securities, asarta equals ' The Euler equation for capital (3.14) equates the marginal Given our technology, this allows total demand deposits to increase by $(1 -7-)141 . Since the initial increase in cash generated a demand deposit liability of $1, total loans can increase by $(1 -nhet + 1. Recall though that for every dollar increase in loans, required reserves rise by $r so that excess reserves fall by Sr. Taking this effect into account, the total increase in
loans generated by an initial increase in At , astiaAt equals
The Euler equation
for At , (3.17), equates, rat (marginal cost of an extra unit of A t ) to as Pi rit (the marginal revenue generated by the extra unit of cash).
It is worth pointing out that the capital labor ratio in banking, kbanbt equals the capital labor ratio in goods production, kft lizit and that the work week in both week in both sectors is equal. This result follows by comparing the first order conditions for profit maximization in the two sectors. Specifically, dividing (3.14) by (3.15) and (3.15) by (3.16) we obtain an equation that equates the capital labor ratio with the ratio of the wage rate to the rental rate. In addition we obtain an equation that relates the workweek and the capital labor and (rid ) to the marginal revenue generated by the extra unit of ratio to the ratio of the HP(1 ft ). Performing similar operation on the goods producing firm's first order conditions, it is easy to see that we obtain equations identical to those which we just obtained for the bank. The result follows.
The Household
The representative household ranks alternative streams of consumption and leisure using the criterion function
Here ne is the probability of being employed, Cr denotes time t consumption if employed,
L4 denotes time t leisure if employed, Cf denotes time t consumption if unemployed, 14
denotes time leisure if unemployed, and E 0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on the household's information set at the beginning of time 0. Below we discuss agents' information sets in greater detail. We assume that the period utility function is given by
We normalize the household's time endowment to be 1. The household divides its time endowment into leisure, hours worked in the market place, if a job is found, time spent acquiring consumption goods, 1 2e, and time spent searching for employment, 13t.
The technology involving 12t is motivated by ideas in McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) and Lucas (1993) . In particular, we suppose that households use currency, demand deposits and time to purchase consumption goods. The transactions technology is given by
Here J and 0 are nonnegative scalars. where vo and vi are nonnegative scalars. The basic idea here is that spending more time on search raises the probability of finding employment.
We now consider the choice problem of the representative household. In our quantitative work we assume that there are adjustment costs associated with changing portfolios between periods. For expositional reasons, we suppress these adjustment costs for now. This allows us to display the basic intuition underlying the household's Euler equation in a way that preserves on notation. In the next subsection we explicitly describe the adjustment cost technology.
We assume that there are perfect markets to insure households against the idiosyncratic risk of finding a job. In addition we assume that the time devoted by the household to finding a job, 13t , is observable. This implies that households receive labor income W (1t)nt if they choose a workweek of length of It and a probability of finding a job n t . Notice that with specifications, households which are identical ex ante in their labor market decisions, receive the same income regardless of whether they are successful in finding a job.
Total household demand deposits are given by
According to relation (3.24), households' demand deposits consist of cash that households deposit at the bank at the beginning of the period plus wage income and the rental income from capital, which are assumed to be directly deposited into households' checking accounts.
The households flow budget equation is given by
Here Ft denotes lump sum dividends equal to the time t profits of the representative banking firm. The variable Q t denotes beginning of period t nominal assets. These must be allocated between currency, Mt , and demand deposits, A t :
Relation (3.26) indicates that the cost of investment is This reflects two assumptions.
l+rat First, investments must be financed with borrowed funds. Second, the demand deposits that are created when banks issue investment loans pay interest at the rate rat . This implies that for each dollar that the household wishes to invest at the end of the period, it needs to borrow (1 + rat )-1 dollars at the beginning of the period. Since the interest rate on these loans is rft the cost of a one dollar investment is 1±1-te • The assumption that banks pay interest at rate 11-rat rat rather than Fat on demand deposits created from investment loans is supposed to capture the notion that in reality investment activities are carried out by specialized firms on behalf of households. These firms are in closer contact with capital markets than households are on a day to day basis and earn an interest more analogous to r at than Eat . We conjecture that our qualitative results would be the same if we assumed that the cost of investment equals
14-7t
1-Frat.
Information Sets and the Household's Decisions
In order for the household's problem to be well defined, we need to be specify the information set that is available when various decisions are made. To this end, we let Si t denote the history of all shocks up to the end of time t, not including the time t realizations of idiosyncratic shocks indicating whether a given household has found employment. Let denote the union of Si t and the idiosyncratic employment shock.
The household's problem is to maximize (3.20) marginal utility benefits of these returns.
To understand (3.36), suppose that the household works one more unit of time in the market place and consumes the proceeds. There are two returns associated with this action.
First, there is the effective utility gain in consumption, given by the first term on the left hand side of (3.36). Second, recall that wage payments are credited to household's checking accounts. Because of the assumed transactions technology, these payments reduce time spent transacting. The utility value of this reduction is given by the second term on the left hand side of (3.36). This action results in a loss in leisure, the utility value of which is given by the last term on the left hand side of (3.36). The intuition for (3.37) is similar to that underlying the (3.36).
To understand (3.38) suppose that the household spends one dollar less on time t consumption, increases its holding of M t+ , and then spends it on time t+1 consumption. The first term on the left hand side of (3.38) gives the time t effective utility loss associated with this action. The second term on the left hand side of (3.38) gives the effective utility gain associated with increasing consumption by 1/Pt+ , units. The third term on the left hand side reflects the utility gain associated with the reduction in 1 2t+ , that occurs because Mt+1 has been raised by one dollar.
To understand (3.39), suppose that the consumer reduces M t by one unit, increases At and uses the proceeds to increase Ct+ ,. Given our transactions technology, the net effect on 12t equals BM (6)12g • The utility value of this change in 12 t is given by the second t At-Ext+wtt,, term on the left hand side of (3.39). The net increase in Q t+ , due to the reallocation is Fat . Viewed from the perspective of time t, the utility value of these extra dollars equals Fat ,8E Oct+, / Pt+, -OUt2 t+ii t tt From (3.38), this equals the first term on the left hand side of (3.39).
We conclude this subsection by deriving the time t forward price, qt (cot ), of a dollar in state cat . We express this price in terms of beginning of period t dollars before cat is realized.
Our strategy is to describe an alternative interpretation of the model in which agents set contingency plans for all variables. The limited participation constraint takes the form of a restriction on the contingency plans for A t and Mt . Specifically, we require that A t and Mt be the same for all realizations of ta t . Under these circumstances, the household's budget constraint can be expressed as
The first order condition with respect to consumption is now:
where lino is the Lagrange multiplier on (3.40). Comparing (3.41) with (3.27) we see that Aoqt(wt) = A t where At is the Lagrange multiplier on (3.25). Since At = Oct, q t (co l ) is proportional to act . It follows that
which gives a complete characterization of Fat.
Allowing for Adjustment Costs
The key friction embedded in our model is the limited participation assumption. We have formulated this friction by assuming that it is infinitely costly for households to adjust their portfolios within the period but costless to adjust portfolios between periods. Formulating the friction in this manner, has an important disadvantage. As in Lucas (1990) , Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) , the liquidity effects associated with a monetary policy shock last only one period. To generate persistent liquidity effects, we extend our baseline specification and suppose that there are adjustment costs associated with changing household portfolios. In a precise sense to be defined below, very small adjustment costs render the model consistent with the notion that positive monetary policy shocks lead to persistent declines in short term interest rates. We now consider a variety of narrower monetary aggregates. Total bank reserves can be divided into required and excess reserves. In our model, these correspond to T Dt and Et , respectively. Total bank reserves can also be divided into borrowed and non-borrowed components. To explain how we model these we discuss our assumptions about monetary policy.
We suppose that the base evolves according to mot+ , = (1 + xt)M0i, (3.46) where the net growth rate of the base, x t , consists of two components:
We assume that x11 is purely exogenous, and evolves according to
where x is a positive scalar, jp r j < 1 and 61. 1 1 is a mean zero, iid shock which has standard deviation an , and is uncorrelated with all other shocks in the model.
The second component of x t, x21 , is a function of the time t innovations to the economy.
In our stochastic simulations, we allow only for two types of shocks, shocks to Z it , and shocks to the goods production function, x ft . We proceed under the assumption:
where bi and 62 are scalars, 0 < p < 1, and L is the lag operator. We interpret x 2t M0 t as the change in the stock of borrowed reserves. The change in nonborrowed reserves equals the change in total reserves, less the change in borrowed reserves.
In (3.49) b1 + 62 represents the impact effect of a technology shock on borrowed reserves.
We assume that this effect is positive, so that the specification parsimoniously captures the notion emphasized by Goodfriend (1983) and others that the rationing rule used by the Fed at the discount window makes borrowed reserves an increasing function of shocks which raise short term interest rates. 6 We also assume b1 b2/(1 -p) = 0. This corresponds to the assumption that any funds injected at the discount window are ultimately withdrawn. This captures the notion that loans made at the window are transitory in nature, and must be repaid.
6Others who take this approach include Coleman, Gilles and Labadie (1994) and the references therein.
Quantitative Properties of the Model

Parameter Values
In this section we analyze the quantitative properties of our model. We begin by discussing the model parameter values. To date we have not formally estimated these parameters, but we plan to do so in the future.
The model has 25 parameters. The first 11, (a, A 1 , vo, 8, p x , r, A 1 , A 2 ), were set as follows. The reserve requirement, r, was set to 0.06, the sample average of the ratio of required reserves to M1 net of currency in the hands of the public. The production function parameter a was set to 0.36, a standard number in the real business cycle literature. The production parameter A l was normalized to 1. The growth rate of productivity, ft,,was set so as to imply an unconditional annual growth rate of output of 1.6%. This is the rate of growth of per capita output reported for the post-war period in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
The risk aversion parameter was chosen to equal -0.5. The depreciation rate, 8, was set to imply an annual rate of depreciation of 8%, based on the investment and capital stock data analyzed in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) . Finally, the money growth rate, x, was set so as to imply an unconditional annual rate of growth of 6.5% in the monetary base. This was chosen so that the model would imply an annual inflation rate of 4.8% in steady state, the post-war annual average. The parameters, A I and A2 were set to 1 and 0.3, respectively, after experimenting with different values. The search technology parameter 1/ 1 was chosen to equal 3.4. This implies that a 1% increase in time devoted to search leads to a 0.3% increase in the probability of finding employment. To obtain a value for vo, we suppose that each unemployed person in the U.S. spends the same fraction of time, lit , as an employed person spends working. In addition, we make the simplifying assumption that employed people do not engage in search. Under these assumptions, the mean of 13t is the product of the mean of the unemployment rate times the mean of the labor force participation rate times the mean value of Ira : The parameters pf and p,, were set to 0.5 and 0.1. We set af and ax to 0.0097 and 0.0038.
Finally, we set the borrowed reserves parameters bt , 62 , and p to 3, -2.1 and 0.3, respectively. These parameters were chosen by an informal search procedure that we view as a prelude to formal estimation. Our objective in this search was to identify a parameterization of the model which captures the facts emphasized in section 2 and which is consistent with the observed variability in aggregate output. All reported second moment properties of the model pertain to the model period. To evaluate the plausibility of the other parameters, it is useful to look at their implications for the non stochastic steady state of the model. These are summarized in Table 2 Using the data discussed in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), we find that the sample average values of these variables are 0.73 and 2.65. Next consider the value of n, the fraction of the population who are employed. According to our model, n = 0.48. The sample average of the ratio of employed civilian workers to the civilian non-institutional population over the age of 16 is 0.59. The ratio of total employment (including the military) to the total population is 0.415. Given the ambiguity regarding which measure of the population is appropriate for our model, a value of n = .48 seems reasonable. Next, according to the model, h is equal to 0.0004. Table 3 summarizes the balance sheet of the banking sector in non stochastic steady state.
The main things to notice are that (i) consistent with the data, average excess reserves are very small, and (ii) roughly 75% of the bank's assets consist of working capital loans. The remaining assets consist of reserves and loans to fund investment. All of the banks' liabilities consist of demand deposits.
Impulse Response Functions
In this subsection we discuss the dynamic response of our model economy to a unit shock in ex, and cf . To compute these responses, we use the approximate log linear solution procedure discussed in Christiano and Valdivia (1994) .
A Shock to the Growth Rate of Money
The three panels in Table 5 report the contemporaneous and lagged responses of several variables to a one percentage point innovation in the growth rate of the monetary base.
Consider first the response of short term interest rates (Panel A). In the impact period of the shock, rit and rat fall by roughly 43 and 40 basis points, respectively, after which they converge to their unchanged non stochastic steady state path from below.
The limited participation mechanism underlying the contemporaneous decline in interest rates assumes that households cannot increase their holdings of currency in response to a positive money shock. As a result, the innovation in the monetary base shows up dollarfor-dollar as a rise in the reserves of banks. This generates a liquidity effect, which exerts downward pressure on the interest rate, as banks lend out their extra reserves. We have assumed that the growth rate of the base is positively autocorrelated, so that a money shock also generates upward pressure on interest rates, via an expected inflation effect. Which effect dominates is a quantitative issue. In our model, the liquidity effect dominates.
The result that a monetary policy shock induces a persistent decline in interest rates, reflects the assumption that it is costly for households to increase their currency holdings.
Because of these costs, currency holdings rise to their new steady state path only slowly from below. Throughout the transition period, a relatively high proportion of the base consists of reserves in the banking system. And as long as this is the case, interest rates remain relatively low.
A natural question is: how large are our assumed adjustment costs? Based on the following calculations, we conclude that the costs are very small. We reach this conclusion by computing agents' portfolio decisions when they (sub optimally) ignore adjustment costs and by measuring the amount of time, 14 , that the resulting rapid portfolio adjustments entail. The resulting sequence of time spent on adjusting portfolios, 1 4i , is a measure of the adjustment costs that the optimal decision rules avoid. We find that the sequence of I4's computed in this way amount to less than one minute a week over the first six months after a one percentage point shock to money growth. Evidently, only very small adjustment costs in Mi nlift _t are needed to generate persistent liquidity effects. Adjustment costs of such small magnitude seem very plausible.
Next, we consider the response of different monetary aggregates to a positive monetary policy shock. According to Table 5 , such a shock leads to sizable, persistent increases in bank reserves, MO, Ml, and excess reserves. The increase in MI reflects a rise in bank loans, which generates a rise in demand deposits. Excess reserves rise because the opportunity cost of holding them (r ft ) has declined.
A key feature of our results is the differential sensitivity of bank reserves, MO and MI to the monetary policy shock.' Initially, MO rises by 0.99%, after which it converges to its new steady state path, which is 1.10 percent above the unshocked path. In contrast, reserves initially rise by more than 6%. This sensitivity reflects the limited participation assumption.
In particular, all of the initial increase in the MO must take the form of an increase in bank reserves.
According to Table 5 , M1 is also more sensitive than MO to a monetary policy shock.
Initially M1 rises by about 2.2% and then slowly converges to its steady state path from above. The sensitivity of M1 reflects a sharp expansion in the 'endogenous' components of M1 in response to the policy shock. Specifically, the decline in interest rates following the policy shock is associated with a rise in bank loans for working capital and investment purchases. So, for different reasons, reserves and M1 rise more sharply than MO following a positive monetary policy shock.
Next, we consider the response of various real quantities to a positive monetary policy shock. Table 5 reveals that such a shock leads to a rise in consumption, investment, goods output, the total number of people employed and hours worked per employed person (tit).
The intuition for the rise in employment is similar to that underlying the analog result in simple cash in advance limited participation models. Firms must obtain loans from banks to pay labor. By reducing the marginal cost of labor, the fall in interest rates after a positive policy shock leads to a rise in the demand for labor. While there are other potentially offsetting effects, the demand for labor effect is the dominant one in terms of explaining the movement in aggregate employment.
'Recall that, absent monetary accommodation to the technology shock and given the limited participation assumption, the response of nonborrowed and total reserves to a monetary policy shock is identical.
Notice that the number of people employed in the banking sector, n b , declines even though lit rises. The intuition for the decline in ri b is as follows. After the policy shock, goods output rises, drawing resources -both capital and people -from the banking sector into the goods producing sector. A simple calculation shows that the rise in hours worked in the banking sector does not compensate for the fall in lebt and n bt . However the rise in excess reserves allows total output of the banking sector to expand. Table 5 also reveals an important shortcoming of our model: the inflation rate rises sharply in the impact period of the shock. Thereafter, inflation falls and converges to its nonstochastic steady state level from below. This response pattern is inconsistent with empirical estimates reported in the literature. For example, an implication of results in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1994) is that, after a positive monetary policy shock, the inflation rate does not respond for about a year, after which it rises. Tables 6 and 7 report the contemporaneous and lagged responses of several variables to a one percent positive shock to the technology for producing goods. Table 6 assumes there is no monetary accommodation via the discount window (i.e., bl = 62 = 0), while Table 7 reports results for the case with accommodation, with parameter values reported in Table 1 .
A Technology Shock to the Goods Producing Sector
According to Table 6 , a shock to x ft leads to a persistent rise in employment, average hours worked, output, consumption and investment. The intuition for these effects is very similar to that underlying the effects of a technology shock in standard Real Business Cycle models.
On the monetary side of the economy, the shock to X ft stimulates a rise in the demand for loans by firms. Banks supply the increased loans, which show up as an increase in Ml, by hiring more factors of production and, in the impact period of the shock, running down excess reserves. In the impact period of the shock, the banking system cannot increase loans except by reducing excess reserves. This reflects the no-accommodation assumption on the discount window, as well as the limited participation assumption. After a one period delay, reserves flow into the banking system as households respond to higher interest rates by decreasing their currency holdings, and increasing deposits, A. Banks use these reserves to increase loans and replenish excess reserves. The net result is that technology shocks induce positive co-movements between reserves, M1 and interest rates.
Notice also that, according to the model, both technology and monetary policy shocks, induce positive comovements between output and various monetary aggregates. So, the model captures the endogeneity of broad monetary aggregates to non-policy shocks emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , and King and Plosser (1984) , among others. At the same time, because of the limited participation assumption, M1 responds more sharply to output, at least contemporaneously, than does reserves. This differential sensitivity is, in principle, capable of rationalizing the fact, documented in section 2, that M1 is more highly correlated (at least contemporaneously) with output than is nonborrowed reserves.
In the previous experiment, a shock to technology does not change the monetary base.
Analyzing this case is useful for building intuition about the effects of a technology shock. It also shows why it is important to have a feedback component to monetary policy. Without this, we could not account for the observed positive correlation between the interest rate and the monetary base. With accommodation, the model has a source of positive co-movements between the base and interest rates. That this is the case is evident from Table 7 . Also notice from that table that, with 62 < 0, the base quickly reverts to its unperturbed steady state path, as the borrowed reserves injected at the time of the technology shock are withdrawn.
For the most part, the responses reported in Table 7 are just a simple combination of the responses in Tables 5 and 6 . Still, there are five features of Table 7 that we wish to emphasize. First, the response of nonborrowed reserves is now sharply different from that of total reserves. For example, in the impact period of the shock nonborrowed reserves remain unchanged, while total reserves are up 5.4 percent. All of this rise in total reserves reflects the increase in borrowed reserves. Second, excess reserves no longer fall -instead, they rise sharply -in the period of the technology shock. Third, the base and MI rise by more when there is monetary accommodation. Fourth, the borrowed reserves policy has the effect of reducing the equilibrium interest rate response to a technology shock. In this sense, the discount window acts to smooth interest rates. Fifth, the borrowed reserves policy has the effect of increasing the output response of a technology shock. analyze the last two phenomena in a cash-in-advance, limited participation economy.
Second Moment Properties
In this subsection we discuss the second moment properties of the model. We begin by considering the implications of the model for real variables. We then turn to the monetary properties of the model.
Real Variables
Tables 7a and 7b report selected second moments of real variables for the U.S. data and for our model, respectively. The key property to note here is that our model shares most of the strengths and weaknesses of standard real business cycle models. For example, it accurately predicts that consumption is smooth relative to income, and that investment is volatile. Like most real business cycle models, it fairs less well in accounting for aspects of labor market fluctuations. For example, it under predicts the volatility of employment and hours worked per employed person and over predicts the correlation of productivity with output. A success of the model is that it accurately predicts that hours per person is about half as volatile as employment. Still the main finding here is that the real variables in our model economy behave very much as they do in standard real business cycle models. In fact, when we shut down the stochastic components of the monetary base, we found that the second moment properties reported in Table 7b were virtually unaffected.
Monetary Variables
We now turn to the implications of our model for monetary variables. We first consider the sign switch observations. We then turn to the money-output and interest rate-output correlations.
Panel A of Table 9 presents estimates of the correlation between the federal funds rate and various monetary aggregates (see the last three rows). The analog correlations for the baseline model are presented in Panel B. In comparing the numbers in these tables, it is useful to bear in mind that the model time period is one-half the data sampling period.
Fourth, key features of these results are worth noting. First, the model correctly accounts for the ranking of the contemporaneous correlations of the various monetary aggregates with the federal funds rate. Going from most to least highly correlated with r a , this ranking is given by Ml, the base, reserves and nonborrowed reserves, respectively. Second, the model correctly accounts for the fact that r a displays a weak correlation with the first three of these monetary aggregates and displays a strong negative correlation with nonborrowed reserves. From a quantitative point of view, the model closely matches the contemporaneous correlation between these variables. Third, the model reproduces a basic feature of the correlation functions between ra and the base, and between r a and Ml. Specifically, the model is consistent with the fact that ra is positively correlated with lagged values of the base and Ml, but negatively correlated with their future values. Fourth, at a quantitative level, the model is less successful at reproducing the negative correlation between r a and future nonborrowed reserves and MI.
To understand this last shortcoming recall that, in our model, technology shocks contribute to a positive correlation between ra and future monetary aggregates, while monetary shocks contribute to a negative correlation. The first effect arises because a positive technology shock leads to a contemporaneous rise in the interest rate and to a persistent rise in output, as well as nonborrowed reserves and Ml. The second effect arises because a positive monetary policy shock leads to a fall in the current interest rate and a persistent rise in output, as well as nonborrowed reserves and Ml. The shortcoming of the model reflects the relative importance of the role of technology shocks. This suggests two remedies to the problem: make the dynamic impact of technology shocks on output less important and/or make the dynamic impact of a monetary policy shock on output less important.' The base does better with respect to these correlations because the technology shock does not have an important dynamic effect on MO. This reflects our discount window policy, according to which reserves that are injected in the impact period of a shock are withdrawn thereafter.
To help convey intuition about the features of our model which allow it to account for the sign switch, Panels B and C of Table 9 report results for two variants of the model. Panel B pertains to a variant of the baseline model in which there are no borrowed reserves, i.e. ' There is a third option: increase the impact effect of a monetary policy shock on the interest rate and/or decrease the impact effect of a technology shock on the interest rate. We are somewhat skeptical of this solution because the contemporaneous interest rate effect of a technology shock is already quite low in the model, while the contemporaneous interest rate effect of a monetary policy shock is high. Comparing the results in Panels B and D allows us to evaluate the impact of the limited participation assumption on our analysis. The key thing to note is that all the contemporaneous correlations are positive. This is because, absent a liquidity effect, exogenous shocks to the growth rate of the base drive interest rates up, not down. So, in our analysis limited participation is a necessary condition to account for the sign switch.
We now turn to an analysis of the correlation between the interest rate and output. First, notice that the model does well at matching the contemporaneous correlation between ra and output. At a qualitative level, it reproduces the fact that the correlation between ra and past output is much greater than the correlation between r a and future output. However, it does not reproduce the strong negative correlation between ra and future output that is observed in the data. This reflects the relative importance of technology shocks in our model. Going from most to least highly correlated with output, this ranking is given by Ml, the base, reserves and nonborrowed reserves, respectively. Third, the model correctly accounts for the positive contemporaneous correlation between output and MI and the base, although it considerably overstates it. Finally, it does not account for the negative contemporaneous correlation in the data between nonborrowed reserves and output. This may reflect omitted shocks or a misspecified monetary policy rule.
Conclusion
This paper showed that broad monetary aggregates like bank reserves, MO and Ml, are positively correlated and nonborrowed reserves are negatively correlated, with current and future values of the interest rate. In addition, the paper presents a model which quantifies a particular explanation for this 'sign switch' in the dynamic relation between various monetary aggregates and short term interest rates.
Our model accounts for the negative correlation between nonborrowed reserves and the interest rate as reflecting (i) the relative importance of exogenous money supply shocks in nonborrowed reserves and (ii) the importance of liquidity effects in the monetary transmission mechanism.
In order for our argument to be fully convincing, we must show that our model at least reproduces the salient features of post war US business cycle data. We intend to investigate whether this is the case in a future draft of the paper using formal econometric methods.
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